Palabras clave
información imperfecta
diseño y funcionamiento
Cómo citar
Resumen
La literatura económica convencional caracteriza a las cooperativas como un arreglo organizacional inviable e ineficiente. Sin embargo, la economía del comportamiento y múltiples estudios empíricos muestran que dicha caracterización no es correcta. En este trabajo se hace una revisión de la literatura económica concerniente al funcionamiento de las cooperativas de trabajadores para enriquecer el material docente e incentivar la investigación sobre estas organizaciones. Los textos fueron escogidos con base en su pertenencia a cuatro tópicos: comportamiento de la oferta productiva; el número óptimo de socios y trabajadores eventuales; los mecanismos para incentivar el esfuerzo, y las decisiones de inversión y financiamiento. La revisión permite explicar por qué las cooperativas tienden a ser pequeñas, por qué es deseable que estén insertas en redes, por qué es importante que exista un límite al uso de trabajadores eventuales; qué mecanismos se utilizan para fortalecer el espíritu comunitario y cómo lograr una buena toma de decisiones sobre problemáticas intertemporales.
Citas
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